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THE BRIGHT SIDE OF PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING
Michael S. Kangt
During conference deliberations for Davis v. Bandemer, a partisan
redistricting case in which the majority party had gerrymandered its way
to 57 percent of state house seats with only 48 percent of the vote, Justice
O'Connor remarked that any politician who does not exploit the redis-
tricting process for partisan purposes "ought to be impeached."' Few
politicians today would lose their jobs under Justice O'Connor's stan-
dard. Indeed, redistricters in several states have broken from longstand-
ing precedent with multiple mid-decade redistrictings, while aggressive
partisan gerrymanders successfully helped dislodge minority party in-
cumbents in Texas, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Critics across the
country responded by protesting that in a democracy, voters should pick
their representatives, not the other way around. 2
The United States Supreme Court nonetheless refused an invitation
to intervene against partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
3
Many hoped that Vieth would clarify the Court's decision of almost
twenty years ago, Davis v. Bandemer, in which the Supreme Court ini-
tially announced the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. 4 In
the absence of a clear standard for unconstitutional gerrymandering
under Bandemer, no redistricting plan had been invalidated as a partisan
gerrymander during the eighteen years since the decision.5 In Vieth, the
t Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. Thanks to Kathryn Abrams,
Robert Ahdieh, Julie Cho, Sam Issacharoff, Kay Levine, Ani Satz, Robert Schapiro, Julie
Seaman, and Sara Stadler for their valuable comments. Many thanks for outstanding research
assistance by Shirley Brener, Michael Fabius, Amol Naik, and Bharath Parthasarathy. I am
also grateful to Amy Flick and Vanessa King for their extraordinary library assistance.
I THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIvATE DIscussIONs BE-
HIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DEciSIONs 866 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (quoting Justice
Brennan's notes from Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
2 See, e.g., Jay Bookman, Democracy Backward Spells Trouble, ATLANTA. J.-CONST.,
Feb. 28, 2005, at Al 1 (arguing that a system in which leaders choose their voters is "democ-
racy backward").
3 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
4 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
5 The one caveat is that a district court found an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander
in Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 WL 60439 (C.A. 4 Feb. 12, 1996)
(per curiam) (unpublished decision). The Fourth Circuit reversed after Republican candidates
for superior court judgeships, the gerrymandered plaintiffs below, won every contested seat in
elections just five days following the district court decision. Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt,
77 F.3d 470 (1996) (per curiam) (unpublished decision).
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Court reiterated the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims but
failed again to decide upon a meaningful standard for such claims.6
I argue that consideration of partisan gerrymandering is best served
by distinguishing between two different strategies in legislative redis-
tricting: (i) offensive gerrymandering; and (ii) defensive gerrymandering.
Simply stated, offensive gerrymandering refers to a redistricting strategy
aimed at making re-election more difficult for the opposition party. The
gerrymandering is "offensive" in the sense that it attacks the opposition.
In contrast, defensive gerrymandering refers to a redistricting strategy
aimed at making re-election safer for one's own party. It is "defensive"
in the sense that it defends what the redistricters already have. Without a
doubt, offensive and defensive gerrymandering are related, often coin-
cide, and are referred to alternately and collectively as partisan gerry-
mandering. However, I argue that distinguishing between the two,
perhaps as opposing poles along a single continuum, illuminates discus-
sion of partisan gerrymandering.
Once I distinguish offensive from defensive gerrymandering, sev-
eral points quickly emerge. First, I argue that Vieth addressed only one
component of partisan gerrymandering: offensive gerrymandering. It
thus did not address incumbent entrenchment through defensive gerry-
mandering, the more important problem today in redistricting. Vieth can-
not be blamed for doing nothing to curb incumbent protection-the issue
was not before the Court in the case.
Second, Vieth is not all bad as a policy outcome, because offensive
gerrymandering is not all that bad. I argue that defensive gerrymander-
ing, by entrenching incumbents and reducing accountability, is the worst
form of gerrymandering. In contrast, offensive gerrymandering de-
creases reelection security for incumbents of both parties. Incumbents,
the least responsive class of candidates for office, are thus forced to be-
come more responsive to the electorate. By allowing offensive gerry-
mandering to continue for the time being, 7 Vieth may have increased
6 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. The legal upshot of Vieth, I would argue, is that Bandemer
is still good law. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth's Gap: Has the Supreme Count Gone From
Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 367 (2005).
7 Last Term, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded another partisan gerrymandering
case for further proceedings consistent with Vieth. See Jackson v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 351 (2004),
remanded sub nom. to Henderson v. Perry, No. 2:03-CV-00354-TJW (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2005)
(holding again on remand concluded that the 2003 redistricting plan was constitutional), avail-
able at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1396.pdf. The Court's summary af-
firmance in Cox v. Larios, 124 S.Ct. 2806 (2004), also signals that courts may be active in
striking against partisan gerrymandering through "second-order" claims like one person, one
vote. See, e.g. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial
Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. Rev. 541, 567 (2004) ("[W]hile Vieth essen-
tially cuts off first-order political gerrymandering claims-that is, plaintiffs cannot get a plan
struck down simply by showing that it constitutes an excessively partisan gerrymander-Cox
v. Larios restores an opportunity for second-order judicial review of political gerrymanders.").
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democratic responsiveness in an indirect way. The bright side of Vieth is
that it did nothing to curb offensive gerrymandering, a healthy dose of
which can be good, and it might help indirectly to reduce defensive ger-
rymandering, less of which would be great.
If Vieth had restricted offensive gerrymandering, redistricters would
focus exclusively on entrenching themselves and their co-partisans in of-
fice. Partisanship in redistricting is inevitable. If limited in one direc-
tion, it must go somewhere else. Rather than pushing redistricting
toward an exclusive focus on defensive gerrymandering, Vieth channeled
redistricting toward healthier directions and left offensive gerrymander-
ing unrestricted.
In Part I, I describe current developments in partisan gerrymander-
ing and how Vieth disappointed critics dissatisfied with partisan gerry-
mandering today. In Part II, I distinguish between offensive and
defensive gerrymandering as two different strategies of partisan gerry-
mandering. I argue that Vieth dealt only with offensive gerrymandering
and therefore was unresponsive to the troubling problems of defensive
gerrymandering. In Part III, I explain that a contrary decision in Vieth to
restrict offensive gerrymandering actually would have led to more defen-
sive gerrymandering, which is far worse. In fact, I contend that offensive
gerrymandering has overlooked virtues that ought to be encouraged,
most prominently the effect of countering the incumbency advantage.
Finally, in Part IV, I close by discussing new developments that
suggest offensive gerrymandering may increase in the future. Party lead-
ers at the national level in particular have become increasingly involved
in redistricting matters and pushed state legislators to become more ag-
gressive in gerrymandering offensively. These developments, coupled
with Vieth, promise more offensive gerrymandering in the years to come.
I. TODAY'S WORLD OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
A. CONTEMPORARY DISSATISFACTION WITH PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING
Popular dissatisfaction with partisan gerrymandering has reached an
apex. The director of Common Cause Boston recently complained that
partisan gerrymandering was "killing democracy."'8 The Economist edi-
torialized that gerrymandering has transformed United States congres-
sional races into a "travesty of democracy," whose sheer
uncompetitiveness "takes one's breath away." 9 Proposals have popped
8 Pamela Wilmot, Gerrymandering Began Here; Let's End It Here, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 16, 2004, at A 15.
9 Pyongyang on the Potomac?: The Congressional Elections, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18,
2004, at 33-34.
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up in several states to reform the process by taking redistricting authority
away from partisan actors. Samuel Issacharoff has argued that redistrict-
ing conducted by partisan actors ought to be held unconstitutional per
se.
10
The first of two major complaints about redistricting is that partisan
gerrymandering has virtually eliminated competitive elections." Redis-
tricting by self-interested politicians in many states has helped ensure
that they face little serious opposition from challengers. Incumbents rig
their re-election prospects by packing their own districts with friendly
voters, which scares off or trounces challengers attempting to take their
seats. As a result, many legislative races are one-sided, uncompetitive,
or uncontested. The executive director of FairVote - The Center for
Voting and Democracy characterizes recent U.S. House elections as "the
least competitive in history."'12 Another commentator, the executive di-
rector of Common Cause, alleges the state of competition in congres-
sional races to be "on a par with elections [in] Cuba and the old Soviet
Union."13
In 2004, only five of 401 House incumbents running for re-election
were defeated. 14 This 99 percent re-election rate was matched during the
postwar era by only the 99 percent re-election rate in 2002.15 In Califor-
nia, none of 153 congressional and state legislative seats at stake in 2004
changed party control. 16 One redistricting scholar called the California
gerrymander "surely the most complete and effective... gerrymander in
American history."'17 Moreover, congressional races in the past two elec-
tion years were the least competitive in recent memory. The proportion
of House races decided by competitive margins was lower in 2002 and
2004 than in any other election years during the postwar period.' 8
10 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 601 (2002) (arguing that "redistricting conducted by incumbent powers is constitutionally
intolerable").
I I See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTnON L. J. 626, 626-27 (2004) (noting two princi-
pal concerns surrounding partisan gerrymandering in the run-up to Vieth: lack of competition
and aggressive partisanship).
12 David S. Broder, No Vote Necessary: Redistricting is Creating a U.S. House of Lords,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A37 (quoting Rob Ritchie).
13 Wilmot, supra note 8.
14 See Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redis-
tricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections (paper delivered at the An-
nual Meeting of the Southern Pol. Sci. Ass'n, New Orleans, La., Jan. 6-8, 2005).
15 See id. at 2.
16 See Governor Adds Propositions to His String of Success, SAN DIGO UNION TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at A20.
17 Jeff Jacoby, Power to the People, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 2005, at DlI (quoting
Alan Heslop of Claremont McKenna College).
18 See Abramowitz, Alexander, & Gunning, supra note 14.
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The second, and distinct, complaint about gerrymandering is that
partisanship has run out of control in the process. This complaint, as I
will argue further in this article, is quite different from the first. The
allegation is that the redistricting process is taking partisanship to un-
precedented levels of viciousness in several states. Political actors are
taking every advantage of their redistricting authority for the purpose of
injuring their partisan opponents.
The claim is partisan gerrymandering produces redistricting that is
unfair and biased overwhelmingly against the minority party. By fixing
the district lines just so, the majority party in control of the redistricting
process can dilute the minority party's vote and require the minority
party to win more votes for the same number of seats. During the current
redistricting cycle, Democrats alleged that Republicans went too far in
exploiting their control of redistricting in a number of key states, includ-
ing Pennsylvania, Michigan, Colorado, and Texas. Sam Hirsch argues
that partisan gerrymandering "may well conspire to keep Republicans in
the majority and Democrats in the minority for the next five Con-
gresses-even if, nationally, Democrats repeatedly capture more con-
gressional votes." 19 Citing what they saw as an egregious case in the
recent Republican gerrymander of Pennsylvania, Democrats argued that
it is "unconstitutional to give a State's million Republicans control over
ten seats while leaving a million Democrats with control over five."
20
The Republican redistricting of Pennsylvania was at the heart of
Vieth v. Jubelirer. Following the 2000 census reapportionment, Republi-
cans controlled the Pennsylvania General Assembly and held an eleven-
to-ten advantage in the state's congressional delegation. At the strong
urging of Republican national leaders, Pennsylvania Republicans locked
out their Democratic counterparts from the redistricting process. After
internal wrangling, the Republicans produced a new redistricting map
that was expected to wrest away from Democratic control at least four,
perhaps five congressional seats. 2 1 The minority leader for the Penn-
sylvania Senate, a Democrat, alleged angrily that "[t]his is strictly meant
to guarantee as many Republican members of Congress as possible.
22
State House minority leader H. William DeWeese, also a Democrat,
19 Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 202 (2003).
20 Brief for Appellants at 23, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580).
21 Republicans expected the new map to produce a thirteen Republican-six Democrat
split in the state's House delegation. See John M.R. Bull, Congress District Re-Map Settled:
GOP Dominated Legislature to Vote on Plan Maximizing Republican Strength, Prrr. POST-
GAzETrE, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al; Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Gain in Pennsylvania's Redis-
tricting Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002, at A04.
22 John L. Micek & Jeff Miller, GOP Readies Redistricting Vote, MORNING CALL (Allen-
town, PA), Jan. 3, 2002, at Al, First Edition (quoting state senator Robert J. Mellow).
448 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:443
called the Republican gerrymander a "colossal bastardization" of the
state's political landscape. 23 Ultimately, the Republican map expanded
the Republican advantage over Democrats in the House delegation from
one seat to five, from an eleven-to-ten ratio to a twelve-to-seven after the
2002 elections, in a state where registered Democrats outnumber regis-
tered Republicans.
B. VIETH v. JUBILIRER
Amid the popular outcry over partisan gerrymandering, the Su-
preme Court last Term decided Vieth v. Jubelirer.24 Vieth addressed
complaints by Pennsylvania Democrats about the partisan gerrymander
executed against them and described above. The Court faced the ques-
tion whether partisan gerrymandering can ever go too far as to warrantjudicial intervention. As Justice Scalia's opinion in Vieth put it, "How
much political motivation and effect is too much?" 25
The Court's collective answer in Vieth was ambivalence, giving lit-
tle guidance about what might constitute actionable partisan gerryman-
dering. The Court initially announced the justiciability of partisan
gerrymandering claims almost twenty years ago in Davis v. Bandemer,
the subject of Justice O'Connor's remark quoted above. 26 The Court in
Bandemer articulated the justiciability of a legal claim for partisan gerry-
mandering but failed to identify a neutral baseline against which courts
and litigants could measure partisan unfairness. In Vieth, the Court again
failed to formulate clear standards by which to judge unconstitutional
gerrymandering. The Justices struggled to identify a judicially managea-
ble distinction between permissible and excessive use of redistricting au-
thority for partisan purposes.
On one hand, the Court refused to find excessive partisan gerryman-
dering under the facts presented in Vieth. The Court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim of partisan gerrymandering in the Pennsylvania redistricting
and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.27 Indeed, Justice
Scalia, speaking for four Justices, argued that partisan gerrymandering
presented a political question that should be nonjusticiable per se.28
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court on this
point, refused to foreclose completely future recognition of a partisan
gerrymandering claim. Although Justice Kennedy agreed that no judi-
23 John L. Micek, GOP-run Legislature Approves Redistricting Map, MORNING CALL
(Allentown, PA), Jan. 4, 2002, at B2, First Edition.
24 Vieth 541 U.S. at 267 (2004).
25 Id. at 297.
26 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986).
27 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06.
28 Id.
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cially manageable standard currently exists to adjudicate such claims, he
also explained that the absence of judicially manageable standards today
was no reason for the Court permanently to bar future claims of partisan
gerrymandering. 29 Justice Kennedy urged caution and suggested that
new technology and judicial experience might bring about a manageable
standard to assess these claims.
30
Vieth thus disappointed critics of partisan gerrymandering. 31 In the
face of an obvious gerrymander that critics protested as "one of the most
partisan plans anywhere in the country," 32 Vieth did little to curb partisan
gerrymandering. Vieth left in place the Bandemer standard for adjudicat-
ing partisan gerrymanders and left in place the Pennsylvania redistricting
map imposed by the Republican party. As a result, Vieth promised to do
nothing about the lack of competition in legislative elections or the esca-
lating levels of partisanship in redistricting for a number of states.
II. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING
The contemporary debate over partisan gerrymandering conflates
two distinct concerns about partisan gerrymandering. In this Part, I de-
velop the distinction between concerns about excessive partisanship on
one hand and concerns about incumbency protection and uncompetitive
elections on other hand. I argue that these concerns run in opposite di-
rections on several counts and that Vieth addressed only the latter.
A. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING AND THE TENSION
BETWEEN THEM
Partisan redistricters are motivated to advance two principal goals.
As Samuel Issacharoff put it, "at bottom, the gerrymander is a willful
attempt to advance one's own interests and harm one's rivals."' 33 First,
the party in control of redistricting attempts to win over the seats held by
the minority party-a tactic that I call offensive gerrymandering. Offen-
sive gerrymandering encompasses the first complaint about partisan ger-
rymandering-vicious and excessive partisanship in redistricting.
29 Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 312-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in Ameri-
can Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 433 (2004) (noting that Vieth "did little to stem the
concein over the loss of competitive accountability in American politics"); Jeffrey Toobin, The
Great Election Grab, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63 (citing Vieth as the "one chance
to change the cycle").
32 Redistricting: Six House Democrats Pitted Against Each Other in Pa., CONGRESS
DAILY, Dec. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29917909 (quoting state senator Allen Kukovich,
a Democrat).
33 Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 612-13.
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In offensive gerrymandering, the majority party attacks minority
party incumbents, a strategy that requires the majority party to transfer
enough reliable majority party voters into the districts of those targeted
incumbents.34 Moving majority party voters into districts held by the
minority party makes those seats less secure and weakens those incum-
bents' chances for re-election. The majority party rigs the redistricting
map systematically to place the minority party at a disadvantage, and
take away the minority party's seats.35
The second and distinct goal in partisan gerrymandering is that the
majority party aims to protect its seats-a tactic that I refer to as defen-
sive gerrymandering. Defensive gerrymandering thus encompasses the
second complaint about partisan gerrymandering-incumbent protection
and uncompetitive elections. When gerrymandering defensively to insu-
late one's own incumbents, the majority party increases the likelihood of
retention by moving majority party voters into its incumbents' districts.
As the number of reliably friendly voters in an incumbent's district in-
creases, the safer the incumbent becomes for the next election. Defen-
sive gerrymandering helps insulate incumbents from serious challenges.
It has also contributed to the overwhelming re-election rate in the U.S.
House.36
Offensive and defensive gerrymandering are intrinsically in tension.
Both strategies operate on the assumption that the majority party has a
finite number of secure party voters upon which it can rely. To gerry-
mander defensively, the majority party needs to keep its voters in its own
incumbents' districts to reinforce their chances of holding these seats.
However, to gerrymander offensively and defeat the minority party's in-
34 Redistricters can estimate the probability, based on their demographic characteristics
and voting profile, that voters will vote for a particular party. Although redistricters cannot
predict people's votes with absolute certainty, "in-party" or "out-party" voters are voters who
carry a higher likelihood of a particular vote choice. The availability of rich demographic data
on individual voters makes this task easier and more precise than ever. See Michael S. Kang,
From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for Campaign Finance Law,
73 GEO.WAsH. L. REv. 1070 (2005) (describing the major parties' development and use of
sophisticated voter databases).
35 Another offensive gerrymandering tactic, not discussed in this Article, is arranging
district lines to force minority party incumbents to run against other incumbents or in unfamil-
iar districts. This tactic is called several different names, including "pairing," "kidnapping,"
and "shacking." It can be effective in injuring opposition incumbents without affecting the
majority party's ability to protect its own incumbents. The Pennsylvania gerrymander, de-
scribed above, forced six incumbents, five of whom were Democrats, to run against one
another.
36 See GARY W. Cox & JONATHAN N. KATz, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 127-205 (2002); but see
Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An
Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1 ELECTION L. J. 315, 328-29 (2002) (find-
ing similar incumbency advantage in statewide gubernatorial elections).
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cumbents, redistricters must do exactly the opposite with only a limited
number of voters to redistribute.
Thus, at the margin, the majority party must choose whether to
make its incumbents safer or make the opposition's incumbents less
safe.37 The majority party should prefer not to win any district by ex-
tremely large margins of victory because any vote not needed to keep an
incumbent's seat could be a vote that helps defeat an opposition incum-
bent. It then can spread those otherwise wasted votes across other dis-
tricts where they might boost the majority party's candidate from narrow
defeat to narrow victory. If it hopes to maximize new seats gained
through offensive gerrymandering, the majority party therefore must re-
duce the margin of safety for its own incumbents. The reward of more
seats requires increased risk.
38
In short, the majority party hopes to achieve an efficient distribution
of its voters across districts.39 When offensive gerrymandering is per-
mitted, the majority party must balance between the goals of seats and
security. Offensive gerrymandering forces redistricters to balance
between making one's opponents more vulnerable and making one's
own incumbents more vulnerable.40 Offensive gerrymandering, as a
37 Others have made a related claim that partisan gerrymandering is a self-regulating and
inherently unstable strategy in the sense that greater partisan bias built into a redistricting map
brings greater risk that the map will disadvantage the majority party over time as
demographics and voting preferences change. See BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT
PUZZLE 151-59 (1984) ("[D]emographic considerations such as whether the areas of growth or
decline are in Democratic or Republican strongholds and whether existing trends will continue
should affect the party's thinking"); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Recently, commentators have questioned whether gerrymandering
is self-regulating. See Hirsch, supra note 19, at 210 (arguing that O'Connor's assumption in
her Bandemer concurrence that gerrymandering is a "self-limiting enterprise" has been shown
to be false in recent congressional-level gerrymandering).
I take no position on this self-regulation question, though I agree that advanced technol-
ogy makes offensive gerrymandering far less risky for the majority party. I claim only that, at
the margin, the majority party faces important tradeoffs between offensive and defensive ger-
rymandering, such that more of one requires less of the other and vice versa.
38 Between the major parties, redistricting is a zero-sum game. The Democrats can gain
a new seat only by taking it away from Republican control, and vice versa. Of course, there
are exceptions. When a state gains extra representation after reapportionment, new open seats
that were previously unheld by either party become available. Conversely, when a state loses
seats after reapportionment, one party loses seats without the other gaining any. However, in
the main, redistricting requires a party to take from its opposition.
39 To maximize the number of seats, the majority party seeks efficiency in the sense that
it needs to minimize the number of wasted votes. "Wasted votes" are votes inside a particular
district in excess of the number needed to win the election. See CAIN, supra note 37, at 148;
Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 320, 321
(1985).
40 See Cox & KATZ, supra note 36, at 37-38; Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing
Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 541, 543 (1994); see
also Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 786
(2004) ("In order to introduce partisan bias into a districting scheme, the party in control of
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consequence, makes majority party incumbents proportionally less
safe. 41
Optimal partisan redistricting requires a careful balance between of-
fensive and defensive gerrymandering. Aided by computer technology
and rich demographic data, redistricters attempt to maximize the useful-
ness of every voter to reinforce a fellow incumbent or undermine an op-
ponent. Clearly, redistricters achieve partisan gerrymanders that
incorporate some offensive and some defensive gerrymandering, such
that the offensive and defensive gerrymanders are not dichotomous
types. A dose of defensive gerrymandering always accompanies offen-
sive gerrymandering in ways that redistricters make more efficient every
day. But depending on the case at hand, partisan redistricting might be
directed more toward incumbent protection or more toward aggressive
attacks on the opposition-there is no typical case. A successful partisan
gerrymander accomplishes both competing goals to varying degrees, but
whether a new redistricting map does more to increase partisan bias or
protect incumbents depends on the tradeoff struck between offensive and
defensive gerrymandering. 42
B. VIETH AND OFFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING
Vieth addressed only one side of this redistricting tradeoff-offen-
sive gerrymandering, but not defensive gerrymandering. The plaintiffs'
claim in Vieth was that the majority party in charge of redistricting, the
Pennsylvania Republicans, unfairly ensured that Republicans needed
fewer votes to get the same number of congressional seats as would the
Democrats. The Republicans redistricted such that their candidates
would win by smaller margins but in a larger number of districts. And
they made sure that the Democrats won fewer seats but by larger margins
in each district. Republicans thus made their own party's distribution of
votes far more efficient than the Democrats' vote distribution. This was
the picture definition of an offensive gerrymander. Only offensive gerry-
mandering achieves this kind of partisan bias in redistricting. 43 Offen-
redistricting generally is forced to make districts that it controls less secure and therefore more
responsive to changes in the voting behavior of the electorate.").
41 See CAIN, supra note 37, at 87-89, 148-49. Of course, redistricters often can make any
distribution of in-party votes more efficient to some degree without necessarily jeopardizing
their own incumbents. However, at the margin, redistricters face tradeoffs and must make
those tradeoffs to gerrymander for significant gains.
42 There is rarely a partisan redistricting without some efforts to protect majority party
incumbents, or defensive gerrymandering. However, purely defensive gerrymanders, designed
to protect majority party incumbents without any attempt to undermine minority party incum-
bents, are relatively common. In fact, I argue in Part IV that they are all too common.
43 "Partisan bias" refers to the "degree to which an electoral system unfairly favors one
political party in the translation of statewide (or nationwide) votes into the partisan division of
the legislature." Gelman & King, supra note 40, at 543. In other words, partisan bias measures
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sive gerrymandering allows the majority party to spread its voters more
efficiently than the other side, just as the Republicans did in Vieth.
The plaintiffs' complaint that the Republican distribution of votes
was unfairly more efficient makes clear that Vieth was not about defen-
sive gerrymandering. Defensive gerrymandering generally makes the
distribution of votes less efficient. Incumbents win by larger margins,
therefore less efficiently from their party's standpoint. Defensive gerry-
mandering may lock in the majority party's incumbents, but it does not
reduce the number of votes the majority party needs for the same number
of seats-the heart of the gerrymandering claim in Vieth. The Vieth
plaintiffs did not complain that Republican incumbents were entrenched
in their districts. Instead, they complained that Democratic incumbents
were offensively gerrymandered out of their seats.
Indeed, the Court did not overrule or even mention in Vieth earlier
decisions in which it repeatedly endorsed incumbent protection as a legit-
imate districting goal. The Court has treated offensive and defensive
gerrymandering as clearly distinct, scrutinizing the permissibility of the
former in Vieth but unconditionally approving of the latter. In Gaffiney v.
Cummings, the Court held that a redistricting scheme that divided the
state of New Jersey into safe districts for incumbents of both major par-
ties was perfectly constitutional.44 The Court resolved that "judicial in-
terest should be at its lowest ebb" when partisan redistricting splits the
state among incumbents and achieves such a "more politically fair re-
sult."'45 Similarly, the Court repeatedly held in reapportionment cases
that protection of incumbent legislators was a legitimate government in-
terest to pursue in redistricting.46
The question whether redistricters could redraw district lines to pro-
tect incumbents, or could go too far in doing so, was not raised in Vieth.
There was virtually no hope that Vieth would redress the noncompetitive-
ness of elections as a result of partisan gerrymandering. Vieth was
nonresponsive to these important complaints. Vieth was squarely about
the permissibility of offensive gerrymandering. On that question, Vieth
stopped short of providing meaningful restrictions on the ability of redis-
the extent to which a redistricting scheme requires one party to garner more votes than the
other party to win the same number of seats. A highly biased system stacks the deck against
the minority party and requires the minority party to win significantly more votes than the
majority to take over control of the legislature. A neutral bias system treats both parties
equally, requiring roughly the same number of votes to win the same number of seats. I argue
for a more robust conception of responsiveness in Part II.C.
44 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
45 d.at 753-54.
46 See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 84 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964
(1996); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97
(1973).
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tricters to undercut opposition incumbents and skew district lines for par-
tisan gain.
III. FINDING A BRIGHT SIDE TO VIETH
Finding a bright side to Vieth demands an inquiry into whether judi-
cial restriction of offensive gerrymandering would have produced a bet-
ter state of affairs than what we have today. The bright side is that the
Court's decision in Vieth helped direct redistricting toward marginally
better outcomes than would have a decision to restrict offensive gerry-
mandering. I argue that offensive gerrymanders in fact offer overlooked
and important benefits that I will describe in this Part. Conversely, re-
striction of offensive gerrymandering would have encouraged a further
turn to defensive gerrymandering-a far worse state of affairs.47
A. How A CONTRARY DECISION IN VIETH WOULD HAVE PRODUCED
MORE INCUMBENT PROTECTION
If offensive gerrymandering were restricted considerably, as the
Court might have done in Vieth, the majority party would focus solely on
the goal of entrenching its own incumbents. The majority party would
not balance seats and security. Given that offensive and defensive gerry-
mandering are competing goals, a restriction in Vieth on offensive gerry-
mandering might have simply encouraged redistricters to pursue the
unrestricted partisan goal of defensive gerrymandering as a substitute.
A contrary decision in Vieth to restrict offensive gerrymandering
therefore would have guaranteed a nonaggression pact between the major
parties in which neither threatens the incumbents of the other.48 Without
any incentive to trade off security for seats, the majority party would
single-mindedly pad its incumbents' districts with surplus votes, thereby
increasing the security of the minority party incumbents as well. The
opportunity for offensive gerrymandering invites the majority party to
place its incumbents at greater re-election risk in the pursuit of winning
new seats from the opposition. Absent this temptation, the problem of
incumbent self-protection simply gets worse than it stands today.
Why not prohibit both offensive and defensive gerrymandering?
Samuel Issacharoff would go further to restrict both. He proposes that
47 Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 735, featured a redistricting map that technically was drawn by a
nonpartisan expert, but the resulting map is routinely cited as the classic bipartisan gerryman-
der. In Gaffney, New Jersey divided into safe districts for sitting representatives of both par-
ties such that each party enjoyed roughly proportional representation in the congressional
delegation relative to their voting strength.
48 1 borrow the characterization of what I call a defensive gerrymander as "nonaggres-
sion pact between the parties" from Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 599 and Issacharoff &
Karlan, supra note 7, at 572.
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redistricting controlled by partisan actors should be unconstitutional per
se.49 He would remove redistricting authority from the political process
and require nonpartisan decisionmakers to redistrict in a way that would
force the major parties to compete in close races.50 Issacharoff is correct
to assume that political redistricting nearly guarantees partisan gerryman-
dering. But no court has ruled that the involvement of political actors in
redistricting is in any way impermissible, 5 1 nor did the Court in Vieth
come close even to suggesting that the basic choice to commit redistrict-
ing to political actors, by itself, is unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court in
the past suggested almost the opposite that redistricting is a special re-
sponsibility of political institutions. 52 Remember as well that the goal of
the plaintiffs in Vieth was not to cleanse partisanship of every kind from
redistricting. 53 Vieth asked the Court to decide only whether one particu-
lar partisan goal, offensive gerrymandering, could go too far in redistrict-
ing. The Court accepted implicitly throughout that other partisan goals,
most prominently defensive gerrymandering, might fill the void if offen-
sive gerrymandering were restricted. Issacharoff's proposal was thus
never on the table in Vieth.
The question, then, is whether Vieth channels strategic behavior by
political redistricters into more structurally beneficial directions than
they otherwise would pursue if offensive gerrymandering were restricted.
My answer is that Vieth does so. Vieth helped promote responsiveness
and competition, even stopping short of requiring nonpartisan redistrict-
ing by judicial fiat.
In fact, offensive gerrymandering offers important benefits that are
often overlooked. Rather than bemoaning partisanship in redistricting,
we ought to be alert to the ways that partisanship, in the form of offen-
sive gerrymandering, produces greater responsiveness and competition.
49 See Issacharoff, supra note 10.
50 Many commentators question the institutional competence of courts to assess district
lines and question the nonpartisanship of putatively apolitical experts or commissions. See,
e.g., Hirsch, supra note 19, at 180 (advising against "pretending to 'take politics out of the
process' by creating supposedly apolitical redistricting commissions"); Nathaniel Persily, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 674 (2002) ("[I]t is almost impossible to
design institutions to be authentically nonpartisan and politically disinterested.").
51 But see Issacharoff, supra note 10 (proposing a constitutional presumption against
redistricting by self-interested insiders).
52 See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977);
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). Moreover, the Court has tried to extricate itself from
the Shaw v. Reno thicket by excusing gerrymandering that appears race conscious to the de-
gree that redistricters justify those redistricting choices with reference to partisan motivations.
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); see also Melissa L. Saunders, A Cautionary
Tale: Hunt v. Cromartie and the Next Generation of Shaw Litigation, I ELECTION L. J. 173,
191-92 (2002).
53 See Brief for Appellant at 32 in Vieth, (No. 02-1580) (acknowledging that "[piolitics
will always be a part of redistricting").
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In the following sections, I explain two benefits of offensive gerryman-
dering. First, offensive gerrymandering makes incumbents less secure
and more vulnerable to challenge. Second, offensive gerrymandering
produces greater ideological diversity among elected officials and repre-
sents both ideological extremes as well as the political center.
B. INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE AS AN OBSTACLE TO RESPONSIVENESS
Offensive gerrymandering threatens incumbents. First, offensive
gerrymandering places majority party incumbents at greater risk as the
majority party moves friendly voters out of their districts to pursue new
seats elsewhere. Second, offensive gerrymandering places at risk incum-
bents of the minority party, the targets of offensive gerrymandering. Of-
fensive gerrymandering, if successful, defeats minority party incumbents,
forces them to retire, or otherwise deposes them from office.
By threatening incumbents, offensive gerrymandering increases re-
sponsiveness. 54 Responsiveness tracks the degree to which the district-
ing map induces representatives to be responsive to the electorate's
political preferences. 55 In short, a responsive system produces faithful
representation of the electorate's preferences. An unresponsive system
allows representatives to stray from the electorate's preferences without
punishment. While many commentators decry the partisan bias flowing
from gerrymandering, declining responsiveness presents a greater norma-
tive threat. Responsiveness ensures the jettisoning of elected representa-
tives who earn public disapproval and fail to satisfy the public's demands
as a precondition for public office.
The greatest threat to responsiveness is the overwhelming magni-
tude of the incumbency advantage in American politics. It is a truism
within political science that incumbents, on average, enjoy major advan-
tages over challengers. Incumbents boast greater name recognition and
initial favorability than challengers. 56 For instance, congressional in-
54 Indeed, studies have confirmed exactly this resulting combination of increased parti-
san bias and increased responsiveness after partisan redistricting, at least at the state level.
See, e.g., Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242 (1990).
55 King and Gelman explain accordingly that "incumbency largely explains the aggre-
gate level of responsiveness." Gary King & Andrew Gelman, Systemic Consequences of In-
cumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections, 35 Am. J. POL. SC. 110, 130 (1991). Political
scientists employ a technical definition of "electoral responsiveness," which measures sensitiv-
ity to changes in the partisan affiliation of the electorate. Under this definition, a highly re-
sponsive system is likely to produce a change in the partisan composition of the legislature
when a concomitant change occurs in the partisan composition of the electorate. An unrespon-
sive system is likely not to produce changes in the partisan composition of the legislature when
there are changes in the partisan composition of the electorate.
56 See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann & Raymond E. Wolfinger, Candidates and Parties in Con-
gressional Elections, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 617 (1980).
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cumbents are almost universally recognized, and nine out of ten voters
have had contact with their representative. 57 In addition, compared to
challengers, incumbents have a much easier time raising campaign
financing. 58
Incumbents benefit from the advantages of the office in other ways
as well. 59 Incumbents curry favor from voters of all partisan stripes by
providing casework and procuring pork barrel benefits for the district.
60
Morris Fiorina argued that these material benefits from incumbents
helped increase the incumbency advantage since the 1960s, as office-
holders became increasingly adept at "building a personal base of sup-
port, one dependent on personal contacts and favors. '61 Political
campaigns, the critical fora within which candidates reaffirm policy com-
mitments to the electorate, simply matter far less for incumbents than for
nonincumbents and challengers. 62 As a result, party affiliation matters far
less for incumbents than for nonincumbents. 63 Along all measures, in-
partisans rate their representative roughly 15 percent more favorably than
out-partisans, but when a voter's partisanship and candidate preferences
conflict, the voter tends to defect from her party and vote for her
incumbent. 64
Of course, many incumbents are elected in the first place because
they closely represented the interests and preferences of their constitu-
ents. However, over time, it becomes easier for incumbents to stray from
their constituents' wishes and win re-election based on the major advan-
tages of incumbency. Incumbency helps shield officeholders from seri-
57 See id.
58 See Alan Gerber, Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election
Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 401, 409 (1998) ("Since typi-
cal incumbents spend much more than their opponents, the larger campaign budget of incum-
bents translates into a large electoral advantage." ); see also Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, A
Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 352
(1996) (demonstrating through empirical evidence that large war chests deter high quality can-
didates from challenging incumbents). In addition, campaign finance restrictions have a net
effect of advantaging incumbents over challengers. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best
Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 335, 338 (2000).
59 See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974);
Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elec-
tions Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 478 (1996); Gary W. Cox & Scott Morgenstern, The Increas-
ing Advantage of Incumbency in the U.S. States, 18 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 495 (1993).
60 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1989); Patrick J. Sellers, Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns, 92 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 159 (1998).
61 FIORINA, supra note 60, at 57.
62 See id.
63 See, e.g., Barry C. Burden & David C. Kimball, A New Approach to the Study of
Ticket Splitting, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 533 (1998); Mann & Wolfinger, supra note 56, 620-
621; Sellers, supra note 60.
64 See Burden & Kimball, supra note 63; Mann & Wolfinger, supra note 56, at 623-26.
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ous challenges and allows them leeway in their ideological and policy
choices. As a consequence, incumbents generally become less and less
responsive over time, as they gain increasing security in office.
Offensive gerrymandering of the sort examined in Vieth, for
whatever its faults, helps threaten incumbents, the least responsive class
of candidates, and forces them to worry about re-election. Offensive ger-
rymandering, by making incumbents of both parties more vulnerable,
helps counterbalance the advantages of incumbency that insulate office-
holders from challenge. By forcing incumbents to worry about re-elec-
tion, offensive gerrymandering encourages greater responsiveness from
those with the greatest institutional advantages and otherwise least likely
to be responsive.
As a result, turnover in legislatures historically has been greatest in
the first elections following a redistricting. In the 1972, 1982, and 1992
elections, the first ones after the usual once-a-decade redistrictings, turn-
over in the U.S. House of Representatives averaged 45 percent higher
than turnover in other election years. 65 The major exception to the his-
torical pattern is the 2002 elections that, as widely reported, featured dra-
matically less turnover than previous post-redistricting Congresses. The
2002 elections unseated only fifty-four incumbents, fewer than the aver-
age of sixty in the usual election year and far fewer than the average of
eighty-seven following redistricting. 66 This decrease in turnover, how-
ever, is symptomatic of too little offensive gerrymandering, not too
much. As Gary Jacobson explains, "marginal incumbents of both parties
got safer districts" in 2002, with three out of four marginal districts made
safer as a result of redistricting. 67
If anything, this was defensive gerrymandering that reinforced the
incumbent party, rather than offensive gerrymandering that sought to un-
seat the other side. If Vieth significantly restricted offensive gerryman-
dering, as some commentators urged it to do, the likely and perhaps
ironic result would have been even less turnover and greater incumbent
insulation.
65 In the 1972, 1982, and 1992 elections, the first ones after the usual once-a-decade
redistrictings, turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives averaged 45 percent higher than
turnover in other election years. See Hirsch, supra note 19, at 183.
66 See id.
67 Gary C. Jacobson, Terror, Terrain, and Turnout: Explaining the 2002 Midterm Elec-
tions, 118 POL. SCL Q. 1, 10 (2003).
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C. BEYOND PARTY: IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION
Offensive gerrymandering provides another advantage over defen-
sive gerrymandering-ideological diversity in the legislature. 68 Offen-
sive gerrymandering produces a nice mix of safe and competitive
districts and thus produces a nice mix of ideologically extreme and cen-
trist legislators. In contrast, defensive gerrymandering produces an over-
abundance of safe districts, resulting in an excess of ideologically
extreme legislators. Faced with a choice between the array of ideological
diversity produced by offensive or defensive gerrymandering, offensive
gerrymanders wins out again.
First, as explained above, offensive gerrymandering creates compet-
itive districts because the majority party seeks to knock out minority
party incumbents. Competitive districts, in which the incumbent faces
serious challenge, tend to contain closely divided districts in which
Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, are matched
evenly. These districts serve ideological centrism, as both parties field
candidates who gravitate toward the decisive median voter. They nomi-
nate moderate candidates with centrist appeals that will win the median
voter's vote.
Second, offensive gerrymandering also leaves room to preserve a
number of safe districts for both parties. The majority party maintains
safe districts for certain of its own incumbents and protects seats where it
can. The majority party also tries to waste opponent party votes by pack-
ing an excess number of opponent party voters in certain districts. This
packing of opposition votes incidentally creates a few safe districts for
the minority. In the absence of vigorous competition in the general elec-
tion, the strongest electoral competition in these safe districts occurs in
the party primary. 69 The dominant party's nominee will gravitate toward
the ideological extreme of the party's electorate to win the primary vote.
The parties will nominate and advance more ideological candidates in
these safer districts.
As a result, a healthy dose of offensive gerrymandering helps to
generate redistricting maps that produce representation of ideological
centrists and both ideological extremes. Because offensive gerrymander-
ing tends to produce a mixture of safe and competitive districts, it is
likely to produce a concomitant mixture of ideological and centrist dis-
tricts as well. The balance sought by the majority party between protec-
68 See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005)
(arguing in favor of "second-order diversity" in legislative districting by achieving diversity
across districts rather than within districts).
69 Safe districts are those in which one party is clearly favored by a lopsided distribution
of in-party voters. Competition occurs within the district's dominant party rather than across
the two parties.
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tion of its own incumbents and subversion of opposition incumbents
produces an associated balance of ideological extremism and centrism in
representation.
Defensive gerrymandering, by contrast, leads only to greater ideo-
logical polarization, as both parties secure themselves safe one-party dis-
tricts. To create safer districts for each party, defensive gerrymandering
dictates the placement of disproportionately greater numbers of reliably
conservative voters to Republican districts and reliably liberal voters to
Democratic districts. In a world in which offensive gerrymandering is
restricted, neither party has incentive to trade off this safety for the pros-
pect of winning new seats. The result is a collection of districts that
reflects less ideological diversity. Districts tend to be either reliably con-
servative or reliably liberal, without districts that are distinctly centrist
and within which both parties compete for moderate voters.70
It might seem strange to argue that offensive gerrymandering pro-
duces better legislative representation and diversity. In a partial defense
of defensive gerrymandering, Nathaniel Persily asserts that defensive
gerrymandering produces faithful representation because it yields some-
thing closer to proportional representation in the legislature for the major
parties. 71 As he puts it, "When the parties divide a state into politically
homogeneous constituencies, the composition of the legislature is more
reflective of the underlying partisan composition of the electorate. ' 72 In
Persily's view, partisan competition may be injurious to representation,
because a competitive district of voters divided half and half between the
major parties "promises to make the greatest number of voters unhappy
with the outcome of the election. '73 Nearly half the voters will be repre-
sented by a candidate they did not support.
While Persily is correct that offensive gerrymandering is less likely
to produce proportional representation for the parties, he places undue
emphasis on partisanship as his gauge of political representation. The
major parties are merely large coalitions of myriad interests only loosely
connected ideologically to one another. 74 It is insufficiently precise to
judge whether a jurisdiction is represented faithfully with respect to ide-
70 See Issacharoff, supra note 3 1, at 427-31 (arguing that gerrymandering results in par-
tisan distortion, decreased competition, and reduced electoral accountability).
71 Persily, supra note 50.
72 Id. at 668.
73 Id. Of course, I do not argue that party identification is not at all meaningful, just not
as meaningful as Persily contends. Party identification provides a useful guide, as a heuristic
cue, for deciding how to vote in a rough and general way. See Michael S. Kang, Democratiz-
ing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure
Plus", 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1149-51 (2003).
74 See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L.
REv. 131 (2005).
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ology and public policy by looking too narrowly at partisanship.75 There
are centrist Republicans and Democrats and more ideological ones, to
say nothing of the growing number of independent voters. Proportional
representation between the parties does not necessarily indicate faithful
representation because defining representation with respect to partisan-
ship, without looking to ideology or policy preferences (or other deeper
measures of political substance), fails to admit that Republicans may
poorly represent Republicans, and Democrats may poorly represent
Democrats. While defensive gerrymandering may increase the likeli-
hood that a voter is represented by an official of the same party, it also
decreases the representation of centrists in the legislature relative to the
representation of the more ideologically extreme. A dose of offensive
gerrymandering makes it more likely that the legislature will contain a
diverse mix of elected officials representing districts all along the ideo-
logical spectrum, including ideologically extreme representatives from
safer partisan districts but also ideologically moderate representatives
from competitive centrist districts.
None of this is to say that offensive gerrymandering, or partisan
bias, is entirely unproblematic. Party identification and loyalty in the
electorate and legislature matter a great deal. But an analysis of offen-
sive gerrymandering more realistically assesses the problems when it
does not overemphasize the meaningfulness of party identification and
keeps in focus the importance of ideological representation all along the
ideological continuum.
IV. THE NEED FOR MORE OFFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING
If anything, we should wish for more offensive gerrymandering,
rather than less. Offensive gerrymandering provides underrated benefits,
whereas contemporary redistricting already features an excess of defen-
sive gerrymandering by self-interested incumbents. We need more of-
fensive gerrymandering, and Vieth would only have exacerbated things if
the Court had decided to restrict it meaningfully.
Although partisan redistricting should produce a healthy balance of
offensive and defensive gerrymandering, it often does not in practice.
Individual members of the legislature in charge of redistricting tend to
prioritize defensive gerrymandering over offensive gerrymandering, pro-
tection of their own seats over potential party gains. Rather than seeking
75 See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT, & JOHN P. MCIVER, STATEHOUSE
DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1993) (finding that the
major parties' ideological character varies dramatically from state to state). Cross-partisan
affinity, as a partial function of ideological kinship, accounts for ticket-splitting between con-
gressional and presidential elections. See Burden & Kimball, supra note 63.
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to expand their party's delegation by attacking opposition incumbents,
majority party incumbents frequently are content to insulate themselves.
Nevertheless, there are signs besides Vieth that might encourage
more offensive gerrymandering for congressional redistricting in particu-
lar. National party leaders, especially among Republicans, have taken a
keen interest in redistricting and spurred state-level politicians in the di-
rection of offensive gerrymandering. National party leaders, represent-
ing their national party's institutional interests in more congressional
seats, are forcing incumbents to assume greater electoral risk in the inter-
est of expanding the party's overall representation.
A. Too MUCH DEFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING, Too LITTLE
OFFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING
Redistricting occurs at least once a decade for both the state legisla-
ture and the state's congressional delegation. The majority party in state
government, at least in jurisdictions where redistricting is not handled by
an independent commission, controls the redrawing of district lines both
for itself and for the state's congressional representatives. However, the
majority party in state government tends to be far more concerned with
state redistricting than congressional redistricting.
When the majority party redistricts its own districts for the state
legislature, the self-interest motivation is obvious. State legislators of the
majority party want to retain their individual seats, and they want to re-
tain their party's control of the state legislature. These state legislators
care intensely about state redistricting, but the motivation of self-interest
encourages them to be intensely risk averse both individually and party-
wide. The majority party already holds a majority of legislative seats
and does not need to win over new districts to control the legislature.
The incumbents in charge of the legislature and redistricting have little to
gain from adding risk in search of winning new seats away from the
minority. The majority party seeks to maximize the likelihood of the
retention of its majority rather than to maximize the total number of seats
won.76 Defensive gerrymandering, as a result, dominates over offensive
gerrymandering in state redistricting.
For congressional redistricting, the interests of the state legislators
line up differently. Here, self-interest is only indirect at best. State legis-
76 It is important to note that defensive gerrymandering at times can require district line-
drawing exactly like that needed for offensive gerrymandering. When reapportionment
reduces the number of districts in the state, or the demographics of a state shift dramatically,
the majority party may need to gerrymander aggressively against the minority party just to
retain the same number of seats. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (address-
ing a Georgia redistricting in which Democrats gerrymandered aggressively to retain control of
a state sliding demographically toward the Republican Party).
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lators are not affected dramatically by their party's congressional for-
tunes in the state. Although state legislators, as redistricters, hope to
advance party-wide interests by increasing their party's representation in
Congress, they gain little individually if their party wins a majority of the
state's congressional delegation. 77 What is more, state legislators are re-
districting other people's districts at a different level of government-
congressional representatives at the federal level. The personal self-in-
terest in incumbent protection is therefore absent.78 State legislators, in
sum, have less at stake in congressional redistricting.
Consequently, state legislators in charge of redistricting tend to fo-
cus foremost on state redistricting and generally try to respect their fed-
eral-level counterparts' requests with regard to congressional
redistricting.79 Congressional redistricting is influenced heavily by the
efforts of the state's in-party congresspersons to lobby their state coun-
terparts. Congressional incumbents, of course, want primarily for redis-
tricting to entrench them in office. The incentives for congressional
redistricting thus push toward defensive gerrymandering and incumbent
protection, but not because of the direct self-interest of state legislators.
Instead, state legislators tend to accede to congressional counterparts
who desire more defensive gerrymandering.
Congressional redistricting in fact has historically overemphasized
defensive gerrymandering at the expense of offensive gerrymandering.
Michael Lyons and Peter Galderisi found that congressional redistricting
during the 1990s preserved incumbency protection as the foremost value
whether redistricting occurred under single-party or bipartisan control.
80
Similar studies of redistricting during the 1980s reached the same con-
77 Winning a handful of new seats for the party is also unlikely to be decisive in shifting
the partisan balance in Congress as a whole.
78 State legislators may personally prefer to pursue aggressive offensive gerrymandering
for congressional redistricting. Such a strategy would make in-party congressional incumbents
more vulnerable, but state-level legislators would not be placing their own jobs at risk. The
most ambitious of them might be able to ascend to congressional seats vacated by incumbents
of either party weakened from offensive gerrymandering. See Marshall, supra note 58, at 378
(explaining a similar divergence of interest between state and congressional representatives
with respect to campaign finance reform). Robust defensive gerrymandering simply locks
everyone into place at the congressional level.
79 See, e.g., Richard E. Cohen, Texas Democrats Outplayed Rivals, NAT'L J., Dec. 1,
2001 (describing how Texas state legislators were "consumed" with state redistricting and
neglected congressional redistricting but for lobbying by their congressional counterparts). Of
course, state politicians still press their own priorities in congressional redistricting, even if not
directly related to their re-election fortunes. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 942
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing accommodations in congressional redistricting
made to satisfy state legislators' requests).
80 See Michael Lyons & Peter F. Galderisi, Incumbency, Reapportionment, and U.S.
House Redistricting, 48 POL. RES. Q. 857, 868 (1995).
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clusions 8 '-congressional redistricting insulates incumbents through de-
fensive gerrymandering and is less aggressive in attacking the minority
party through offensive gerrymandering. During the last redistricting cy-
cle, party leaders in several large states, most notably California and Illi-
nois, agreed to essentially bipartisan gerrymanders, calculated to protect
both parties' incumbents from meaningful competition. 82
This tendency is illustrated by the politics of Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger's proposal to submit California redistricting to an inde-
pendent commission. The effect of the proposal would likely be positive
for the Republicans, if anything. Democrats control the state legislature,
which currently handles redistricting, and Democrats outnumber Repub-
licans thirty-three to twenty in the state's congressional delegation.
Nonetheless, Republican congresspersons from California reportedly op-
pose the governor's proposal by a ratio of four-to-one. 83 The Los Ange-
les Times reported, "Even with California Republicans confined to
minority status in both the legislative and congressional delegations,
many members would rather keep the existing lines than gamble on a
plan that could plunk them in unfriendly districts where they would have
trouble getting reelected. '84
B. OFFENSIVE GERRYMANDERING: A FUNCTION OF PARTISAN
LEADERSHIP
The actors with the strongest incentives to encourage state legisla-
tors to gerrymander offensively in congressional redistricting are federal-
level party leaders who have the national party's institutional interests at
heart. While rank-and-file congressional representatives are overwhelm-
ingly concerned with their individual welfare and personal re-election,
party leaders attend to the party's collective welfare. They try to organ-
ize their rank-and-file to capture gains from partisan coordination and
solve the collective action problems that arise when representatives focus
too narrowly on their individual self-interest. Their special responsibili-
81 See Q. Whitfield Ayres & David Whiteman, Congressional Reapportionment in the
1980s: Types and Determinants of Policy Outcomes, 99 POL. Sci. Q. 303, 311-13 (1984);
Cain, supra note 39, at 331; see also Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and In-
cumbency: Leading the Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J. L. & POL. 653, 679-81 (1988).
82 See Jacobson, supra note 67, at 10-11 (discussing the bipartisan gerrymander in Cali-
fornia); John Fund, Gerry-Rigged Democracy, AM. SPECTATOR, June-July 2003 (describing
deals cut in California and Illinois that led to only one competitive congressional race in each
state); see generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term - Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 63-64 (2005).
83 See Peter Nicholas, GOP Fears a Redistricting Backfire, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at
Al ; see generally Nancy Vogel, Looking to Design a Fairer Map, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005,
at B 1; T.R. Reid, Texans Back Colo. Democrats in Redistricting Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
2003, at A02.
84 Nicholas, supra note 83.
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ties include the promotion of the party's reputation, extension of the
party's representation in government, and coordination of the party mem-
bership. Party leaders "internalize the collective electoral fate of the
party."85
Party leaders can play exactly this institutional role in redistricting.
Effective party leadership pushes redistricters to optimize the returns
from gerrymandering, balancing defensive gerrymandering with a
healthy dose of offensive gerrymandering. Redistricters usually need no
reminders to gerrymander defensively and lock themselves or their
friends in office. However, party leaders remind redistricters of party-
wide interests. Leaders encourage the rank-and-file to accept re-election
risks concomitant with offensive gerrymandering designed to increase
the party's overall representation. While state legislators typically ac-
cede to the individual self-interest of congressional incumbents in defen-
sive gerrymandering, national party leaders can intervene and push state
legislators instead to prioritize party-wide interests in offensive
gerrymandering.
It follows that the most aggressive offensive gerrymanders during
the recent cycle of congressional redistricting occurred after energetic
intervention by federal-level party leaders. The offensive gerrymander
by Republicans in Pennsylvania was part of a coordinated strategy by the
national party to advance Republican congressional interests through re-
districting in several states, including Colorado, Ohio, and Texas.
86 In
Pennsylvania, U.S. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, Senator Rick
Santorum, and presidential advisor Karl Rove pressured state Republi-
cans to increase G.O.P. representation in the state's congressional dele-
gation. Santorum, in particular, traveled to Harrisburg and lobbied the
Pennsylvania House majority leader, John Perzel, to pass an aggressive
offensive gerrymander that became known as the "Santorum Plan."
87
The spokesman for the National Republican Congressional Committee
crowed, "The Pennsylvania plan goes a long way to solidifying our net
gain of eight to ten seats nationally."
88
An even clearer case of intervention by self-interested federal offi-
cials came in the most aggressive gerrymander of the cycle, the Texas
85 GARY W. Cox & MATrEW D. McCuBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY Gov-
ERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 133 (1993).
86 See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, THE NATION, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15;
Edsall, supra note 21, at A04.
87 See generally Chris Cillizza, GOP Aims for Six Seats in Penn., ROLL CALL, Dec. 17,
2001; Peter L. DeCoursey, Continual Lobbying Carried GOP-crafted Shift, SUNDAY PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Jan. 6, 2002, at B01; Larry Eichel, GOP Redistricting Gamble Looks
Safe, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 16, 2002, at A15; Claude R. Marx, National Parties Flex
Muscles During Redistricting Fight, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 5, 2002.
88 Chris Cillizza, Republicans Score Big in Pa., ROLL CALL, Jan. 7, 2002 (quoting Carl
Forti).
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congressional redistricting in 2003. In Texas, House majority leader
Tom DeLay played a pivotal role in pushing the Texas legislature, con-
trolled by the Republicans in 2003, to take the unprecedented step of
redistricting the state's congressional map for the second time during the
decade. DeLay's involvement in the Texas legislature's redistricting
process dated back to 2001, before Republican control of the state legis-
lature. 89 Handicapped by Democratic control of the Texas legislature,
DeLay set about to change the legislature's composition. He dispatched
his political aide Jim Ellis to organize a political action committee named
"Texans for a Republican Majority," which would raise $1.5 million to-
ward electing new Republicans to the state legislature.90 DeLay and El-
lis were instantly successful in a state already tilting toward the
Republicans, 9' winning G.O.P. control of the legislature in the 2002 elec-
tions for the first time in 130 years.
Even so, redistricting by the Republican-controlled legislature
seemed quite unlikely as the end of the 2003 term approached. A second
redistricting during the decade would have been unprecedented, and
many state Republicans worried about the divisiveness that another re-
districting would incite. Although the Texas House appointed a redis-
tricting committee, its chairman, Representative Joe Crabb, introduced a
bill that would have continued the then-current districts drawn by the
court. 92 Tom Craddick, Speaker of the Texas House, acknowledged that
he supported a second redistricting, but admitted, "I'm not pushing it."'93
The Texas Senate did not even name a redistricting committee to con-
sider the issue. When Representative Crabb asked the Texas attorney
general to opine on the necessity of a new redistricting, the Republican
attorney general responded that a new congressional redistricting was
permissible but unnecessary. Republican Lieutenant Governor David
89 DeLay testified before the legislative redistricting committee to urge Democrats to
elect congressional Republicans who would advance President Bush's agenda. See R.G. Rat-
cliffe, Plan Shuffles Millions of Texans; DeLay's Investment Pays Off, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
10, 2003, at A01. The legislature ultimately failed to reach agreement on a new redistricting
map, but the task fell to a federal district court that redrew congressional districts favorably to
state Democrats.
90 See Lou DUBOSE & JAN REID, THE HAMMER 203 (2004); Chuck Lindell, DeLay's
Point Man Led Charge on Redistricting, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 22, 2004, at A13.
Not only did DeLay's political action committee fund legal work on redistricting, his daughter
served as a fundraiser for it. See Abramsky, supra note 86, at 15; Lou Dubose & Jan Reid,
The Man with the Plan, TEX. MONTHLY, Aug. 2004, at 98, 101.
91 In 2002, Republicans held 27 statewide offices; the Democrats none. See Connie
Mabin, Political Revolution in Texas as Campaign Season Kicks Off, ASSOCIATED PRESS
STATE & LOCAL NEWSWIRE , Jan. 6, 2002.
92 See Dave McNeely, Redistricting Groundswell Is Missing, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Apr. 24, 2003, at B I.
93 Dave McNeely, DeLay Pushes Legislature to Redo Congressional Maps, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Apr. 25, 2003, at B6 (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Dewhurst described a new round of redistricting as welcome as a "conta-
gious flu."'94 Even Governor Rick Perry dismissed redistricting with a
football metaphor: "It's like, 'Do you want to go run your wind sprints
again?' 95
DeLay personally flew to Austin in April and began an intense lob-
bying effort to resuscitate congressional redistricting.96 He met with
Dewhurst, Craddick, and Perry to press state Republicans on congres-
sional redistricting.9 7 When Texas Democrats fled the state to deprive
the Texas House of a quorum on redistricting, DeLay's office contacted
the Department of Justice and Federal Aviation Administration to help
search for the absent Texas Democrats.9 8 In October, after the governor
called a third special session of the legislature on the redistricting issue,
DeLay again flew to Austin for several days of intense negotiations that
produced agreement among squabbling state Republicans. 99 "If Tom
DeLay hadn't been there, it wouldn't have happened," declared U.S.
Representative Thomas Reynolds, chairman of the National Republican
Congressional Committee. 1°° Other national party figures intervened as
well. Karl Rove and White House spokesperson Karen Hughes spoke
personally with Texas Republicans to emphasize the importance of the
congressional redistricting to President Bush. 10 1 The final redistricting
94 R.G. Ratcliffe, Plan Shuffles Millions of Texans; DeLay's Investment Pays Off, Hous-
TON CHRON., Oct. 10, 2003, at A01 (quoting Lt. Gov. David Dewhurst). Dewhurst explained,
as late as June 10, 2003, that he had repeated "over and over again that [he saw] no consensus
[in the Senate] for a redistricting measure" and that he was "not going to take the lead on
redistricting." See Patricia Kilday Hart, The Unkindest Cut, TEx. MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 44.
At DeLay's prodding, Dewhurst later became one of the Republican ringleaders on the 2003
redistricting. See McNeely, supra note 92.
95 Dubose & Reid, The Man with the Plan, supra note 90, at 162.
96 See Ratcliffe, supra note 94.
97 Jim Ellis reinforced DeLay's efforts, flying down to Austin several days a week from
April through October. See Lindell, supra note 90.
98 Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Rejected Idea of Joining Texas Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2003, at A16; Chuck Lindell, DPS Telephone Call to Feds Comes Under U.S. Scru-
tiny, AusTiN AM.-STATESMAN, May 23, 2003, at B 1; Leif Strickland, Texas Showdown, NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 21, 2003.
99 Shuttling between offices, DeLay spent at least three days brokering a deal among
Craddick, Perry, and Dewhurst, the latter of whom Craddick refused to meet personally. See
Lee Hockstader, Texas GOP Has Intraparty Dispute Over Redistricting, WASH. POST, Sept.
18, 2003, at A03; Guillermo X. Garcia & Peggy Fikac, DeLay Tours Austin in Bid to Get a
Map, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Oct. 8, 2003, at LA; Chuck Lindell, DeLay Defends his
Texas Redistricting Role, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 16, 2003, at A5; R.G. Ratcliffe, supra
note 94.
100 Richard E. Cohen, The Evolution of Tom DeLay, NAT'L J., Nov. 15, 2003, at 3478
(internal quotations marks omitted).
1l See DUBOSE & REID, supra note 90, at 202, 218-19; Abramsky, supra note 86, at 15.
The national parties' interest in congressional redistricting might increase with the adoption in
more states of the congressional district method of allocating electoral votes for presidential
elections. Only Nebraska and Maine currently assign an electoral vote to each congressional
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plan went into effect for the 2004 elections and successfully won five
new Republican seats in the House.
The offensive gerrymander in Texas took place only because of re-
lentless intervention by federal-level party leaders, most prominently
Tom DeLay. DeLay embodied the GOP's national party's interests dur-
ing the Texas redistricting process. As he put it, "I'm the majority
leader, and we want more seats."' 1 2 One internal Republican memoran-
dum insisted that "major adjustments must be made to ensure that the
map reflects the priorities of the congressional delegation and not the
[Texas] Legislature."' 1 3 The Texas congressional redistricting, in short,
reflected the priorities of the Republican national party leadership, which
emphasized offensive gerrymandering in a way that state-level Republi-
cans were unlikely to produce if left alone.'0 4
district and award it to the candidate who receives a plurality of votes in the respective district.
Thanks to the staff of the Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy for this obvservation.
102 David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (quoting DeLay). DeLay's interventions into Texas congressional
redistricting also led to a civil suit and House ethics charges for possible violations of cam-
paign finance law. See Sylvia Moreno & R. Jeffrey Smith, Treasurer of DeLay Group Broke
Texas Election Law, WASH. POST, May 27, 2005, at AOl; Maeve Reston, Can DeLay Ride Out
the Storm?, Prr. POST-GAZET-rE, Apr. 17, 2005, at Al; R.G. Ratcliffe, Political Funding De-
bate to Play Out, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 27, 2005, at B I; Julie Mason & Gebe Martinez,
DeLay Legal Fund Returns $3500 in Contributions, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 8, 2004, at AT.
103 R.G. Ratcliffe, Redistricting Memo Leaked on Eve of Trial; DeLay's Intervention
Blasted, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 11, 2003, at A37 (internal quotations marks omitted). The
memo continued, "The (state) House map, in particular is flawed because it is dominated with
largely insignificant state legislative agendas... We need our map, which has been researched
and vetted (by the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Congressional
Committee) for months." Id. (alterations in original); see also DeLay's Involvement in Texas
Redistricting: Pure Partisan Politics, AUSTIN Am.-STATESMAN, Dec. 12, 2003, at A22. Jim
Ellis insisted that "a map that returns [Democratic incumbents] Frost, Edwards, and Doggett is
unacceptable and not worth all the time invested into this project." DUBOSE & REID, supra
note 90, at 220.
104 Regardless how aggressive the gerrymander, redistricting is limited by the underlying
ideological preferences of voters in the state. Gerrymandering can convert a conservative
Democratic district into a Republican one, but it cannot convert every Democratic seat in an
evenly divided state into a Republican one. The gains from gerrymandering occur at the mar-
gin. Gains at the margin are important, no doubt. Elections and partisan control can be de-
cided at the margin. However, it is easy to overstate the ultimate results from gerrymandering
in any direction. Losses by longtime incumbents like Charlie Stenholm and Martin Frost spark
publicity and partisan outrage, but research indicates that the effects of offensive gerrymander-
ing are impermanent and fade away more quickly than assumed. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Low-
enstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990); DAVID BUTLER &
BRUCE E. CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 32 (1992); Richard G. Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, The Persistence of Partisan Redis-
tricting Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s, 54 J. POL. 565, 570-71
(1992).
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V. CONCLUSION
Any consideration of political redistricting must assume that redis-
tricting will be driven by partisan motivations, unless courts are willing
to take the drastic step of prohibiting political actors from participating in
the process at all. 105 Partisan actors will act in a partisan fashion, and
redistricting is no exception to the rule. Political actors try to achieve
political ends through whatever available means. 10 6 Resourceful politi-
cal actors find ways-whatever ways that remain open-to influence the
political environment in a direction favorable to them and unfavorable to
their opponents. Moreover, pursuing political ends through election law
increases in relative cost-effectiveness as achieving the same ends
through campaigning and winning elections becomes more expensive.
10 7
The remaining question, then, is whether judicial decisions that con-
strain the discretion of partisan actors involved in redistricting will chan-
nel their strategic activity in positive directions rather than worse ones.
Vieth passes this test. Vieth, accepting that gerrymandering is political,
directed redistricting toward balancing offensive and defensive gerry-
mandering. This is a better state of affairs than the exclusive focus on
defensive gerrymandering that would have resulted from restriction of
offensive gerrymandering.
After Vieth, redistricters who might be tempted to focus overwhelm-
ingly on defensive gerrymandering are now free to pursue offensive ger-
rymandering without restriction. And they will shift further toward
offensive gerrymandering when national party leaders actively promote
party-wide interests. Instances of national party intervention, at least on
the congressional level, appeared more common during the recent, and
ongoing, redistricting cycle. 10 8 In sum, redistricting today still suffers
105 See Issacharoff, supra note 10; see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491, 534 (1997). However, the Court in
Vieth did not give serious consideration to holding that political motivations in redistricting are
invidious per se. As Justice Scalia put it later in his dissent to Cox v. Larios, "[Aill but one of
the Justices agreed that [partisan advantage] is a traditional criterion [for redistricting], and a
constitutional one, so long as it does not go too far." Larios, 124 S.Ct. at 2809 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The Court in essence recognized that handing over redistricting to political
actors begets politically motivated decision-making.
106 Indeed, when election administrators fail to apply election law in a decidedly partisan
manner, they may become pariahs within their party for disloyalty. See David Postman, Re-
publican Reed Faces GOP Wrath over Recount Decisions, SEATTLE TiMEs, Jan. 3, 2005, at
Al.
107 A Republican strategist noted that the National Republican Campaign Committee
would spend upwards of $60 million on House races nationwide in 2004, but could pick up
five House seats basically for free as the result of the 2003 redistricting. See Fred Barnes,
Texas Chainsaw Gerrymander, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 13, 2003 at 15.
108 A new trend in redistricting is the "re-redistricting," a second or even third redistrict-
ing in the same decade. See generally Cox, supra note 40. Republicans conducted a third
congressional redistricting of Georgia, while Democrats contemplated a round of re-redistrict-
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from a deficit of offensive gerrymandering, but more offensive gerry-
mandering seems more likely post-Vieth.
ing in other states as retaliation. See Mary McDonald & Sonji Jacobs, Making Law, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., May 4, 2005, at 2B; Chris Cillizza, Democrats Eye Remap Payback, Leaders Tar-
get Illinois, N.M., ROLL CALL, Feb. 22, 2005; Josh Kurtz, Remap Revenge in New York, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 1, 2005; Lauren W. Whittington & Chris Cillizza, Illinois Remap Discussed, ROLL
CALL, Mar. 1, 2005 at 11.
